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You are here : eLibrary : IAHR World Congress Proceedings : 36th Congress - The Hague (2015) FULL PAPERS : THEME 6- WATER RESOURCES AND HYDROINFORMATICS : THE RISK SHARING OPTIMAL SCHEDULING OF MULTI-OWNER HYDRO PLANTS UNDER UNCERTAINTY RESERVOIR INFLOW
THE RISK SHARING OPTIMAL SCHEDULING OF MULTI-OWNER HYDRO PLANTS UNDER UNCERTAINTY RESERVOIR INFLOW
Author : LI MO , QINGQING LI , CHAO WANG , PENG LU , LIU YUAN , WEI WANG & JIANZHONG ZHOU
With the large-scale cascade hydro plants configuration form in China, it makes new challenges to the actual operation of reservoirs. Since the inflow and water level are stochastic, how to design an efficiency model to reduce the influence of the reservoir inflow uncertainties is an important problem for both the upstream and downstream hydro plants. And it is a huge dynamic dimensional optimization question for the optimal operation of multi-owner cascade hydro plants constrained by water use competition and market strategies cooperation. Aiming at attaining the maxim return of cascade hydro plants generation in a specific period, a stochastic scheduling model for multi-owner hydro plants with taking reservoir inflow and water level for random variables is presented by use of fuzzy chance constrained programming. Meanwhile, a compensation contract related to the degree of reservoir inflow and water level is designed to coordinate the risk sharing between the upstream and downstream hydro plants in this paper, which comprises water volume, water discharge, water head and water inflow. By building a dynamic game model and a CVaR (Conditional Value-at-Risk) model, the incentive mechanism to reduce the negative impact of uncertainty inflow is proved to encourage both parties to performance the contract successfully. Combined with numerical calculation, the results show that sharing the risk of uncertainties reservoir inflow and water level can not only increase the profits of the cascade multi-owner hydro plants, but also optimize the profit proportion of the upstream and downstream hydro plants to encourage both parties to achieve risk and revenue sharing.
File Size : 1,025,431 bytes
File Type : Adobe Acrobat Document
Chapter : IAHR World Congress Proceedings
Category : 36th Congress - The Hague (2015) FULL PAPERS
Article : THEME 6- WATER RESOURCES AND HYDROINFORMATICS
Date Published : 20/04/2016
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